From: Subject: NTSB - Press Release Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 14:20:13 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Location: http://www.ntsb.gov/Pressrel/2002/020514c.htm X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2600.0000 NTSB - Press Release FOR IMMEDIATE=20 RELEASE:  May 14,=20 2002           &nb= sp;=20 SB-02-13=20

INCAPACITATED TRUCK DRIVER, POOR PLANNING BY STATE AUTHORITIES LED = TO=20 FATAL WORK ZONE CRASH IN TENNESSEE=20

WASHINGTON, D.C. - The National Transportation Safety Board today = adopted a=20 final report on its investigation into a fatal highway crash in a work = zone in=20 Jackson, Tennessee, citing the truck driver=92s incapacitation and a = flawed=20 medical certification process as the probable cause.  Poor = coordination and=20 planning for the work zone project by the Tennessee Department of=20 Transportation, the Tennessee Highway Patrol and the construction = contractor=20 were found to be contributing factors in the crash.=20

 On July 26, 2000, an eastbound tractor semitrailer traveling at = a=20 driver-estimated speed of 65 miles an hour entered a 55 m.p.h. work zone = and=20 collided with a Tennessee Highway Patrol (THP) vehicle protecting the = work=20 zone.  Witnesses reported that the patrol car exploded and caught = fire at=20 impact.  The patrol car was pushed approximately 192 feet before it = came to=20 rest on the median.  The truck continued through the median and = into the=20 westbound lanes, where it collided with another vehicle.  The State = Trooper=20 in the patrol car was killed in the crash.  Witnesses saw the truck = drifting out of its lane before the accident.=20

 The medical oversight issues presented by this crash were = similar to=20 those dealt with by the Safety Board in its investigation of a fatal = tour bus=20 crash in New Orleans the previous year.  The truck driver in the = Tennessee=20 crash had previously been diagnosed with sleep apnea and hypothyroidism, = and had=20 a similar crash in 1997, when he struck the rear of a patrol car in = Utah.=20

Although neither condition is specifically disqualifying for a = commercial=20 driver=92s license, the Safety Board believes that had a comprehensive = medical=20 oversight program been in place at the time of the accident, this = driver, with=20 known and potentially incapacitating medical conditions, would have been = less=20 likely to have been operating a commercial vehicle.  This accident, = the=20 Board said, =93demonstrates how easily unfit drivers are able to take = advantage of=20 the inadequacies of the current medical system, resulting in potentially = fatal=20 consequences.=94  The Board urged the Federal Motor Carrier Safety=20 Administration and the American Association of Motor Vehicle = Administrators to=20 act quickly to develop a comprehensive medical oversight plan for = commercial=20 drivers.=20

 Motorists had complained about the design of the work zone = before the=20 accident.  The signage was poor and drivers were unsure which lane = was=20 closed.  The Safety Board said that the traffic control and safety = aspects=20 of the work zone operation would have been improved had the construction = contract incorporated traffic control plans for all aspects of the work = zone=20 operation and had it assigned specific responsibilities to each = party.  In=20 fact, the Board noted, the traffic control configuration for this work = zone did=20 not meet federal guidelines for a lane closure on a divided = highway.  In=20 addition, the Board stated that had the Tennessee Highway Patrol = officers=20 received work zone traffic control training, they may have asked for=20 clarification on the traffic control strategy to be used that day, and = would=20 have realized the hazards of positioning their vehicles in the lane = behind the=20 highway construction vehicles.=20

 Work zone fatalities have increased 52 percent over the latest=20 five-year period recorded, from 717 in 1996 to 1,093 in 2000.  = Commercial=20 vehicles, which account for 7 percent of all vehicle miles driven, are = involved=20 in 20 percent of all fatal work zone accidents.  It is impossible = to assess=20 whether the increase in work zone deaths is due simply to increased = traffic=20 patterns or to other reasons because no adequate exposure data is=20 available.  The Safety Board continues to wait for a positive = response to=20 its decade-old recommendation to the Federal Highway Administration to = collect=20 work zone exposure data.=20

 As a result of this investigation, the Board issued four safety = recommendations to the Federal Highway Administration, the National = Highway=20 Traffic Safety Administration, the Tennessee Department of = Transportation, and=20 several associations to develop a model training program for law = enforcement=20 personnel that addresses traffic control strategies for work = zones.  The=20 Board also recommended that FHWA review and revise the Manual for = Uniform=20 Traffic Control Devices to provide guidance on coordination with law = enforcement=20 personnel used in highway work zone traffic control.=20

 A synopsis of the Safety Board=92s report can be found on its = web site=20 under Publications. = ; The=20 full report will be available on the web site in several weeks.=20

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NTSB Press Contact: Ted Lopatkiewicz
 
 

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